After about two years of EU3 diplomatic efforts and the temporary suspension of Iran`s enrichment programme,[92] the IAEA Board of Governors found, in accordance with Article XII.C of the IAEA statute, in a rare non-compliance decision, with 12 abstentions, that these breaches constituted a breach of the IAEA safeguard agreement. [32] This was reported to the UN Security Council in 2006,[93] after which the Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment. [94] Instead, Iran resumed its enrichment program. [95] Article III: Any non-NWS party undertakes to enter into an agreement with the IAEA on the application of its safeguards to all nuclear substances in all peaceful nuclear activities of the State and to prevent the diversion of such materials to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is only unequal, as it obliges non-nuclear states to abandon the development of nuclear weapons while allowing established nuclear states to retain their nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it was accepted because most non-nuclear states had neither the capacity nor the propensity to follow the nuclear path, especially at the time of signing, and they were well aware of the dangers of proliferation to their security. Moreover, in 1968, it was considered that nuclear states, in exchange for their special status, would assist non-nuclear states in developing civil nuclear energy (although the distinction between civilian technology and military nuclear technology was not so simple) and that nuclear states would do their best to agree on disarmament measures. At the 2005 Conference to Review the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this inequality was a major complaint against established nuclear powers. The treaty continues to play an important role in maintaining the international norm against proliferation, but has been challenged by a series of events, including (1) North Korea`s withdrawal from the treaty in 2003, when it was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, (2) evidence of Iraq`s progress in its nuclear program in the 1980s. although he was a signatory to the treaty. , and (3) allegations of uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, another signatory to the treaty. The credibility of the non-proliferation standard was also compromised by the fact that India and Pakistan were declared nuclear powers in 1998 without serious international sanctions – and in fact, India concluded its own special agreements under a bilateral agreement with the United States in 2008.

Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all contracting parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to benefit from international cooperation in this area, in accordance with their non-proliferation obligations. Article IV also encourages this cooperation. [11] This Ā«third pillarĀ» provides for the transfer of nuclear technology and material for peaceful purposes to the NPT parties, as part of the development of civilian nuclear programs in those countries, subject to IAEA safeguards, to demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. [22] Each party to the treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, non-nuclear States Parties that are not nuclear weapons have the least possible benefit of the peaceful use of nuclear explosives, in accordance with this treaty, in accordance with this treaty, under appropriate international control and appropriate international procedures. , and that any burden on research and development be kept to a minimum.